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British public opinion on Brexit: Controversies and contradictions  
Sofia Vasilopoulou and Liisa Talving 
*Author accepted manuscript forthcoming in European Political Science* 
Abstract  
What does Brexit really mean? We examine what people expect from the Brexit deal, 
highlighting three key findings. First, while trade is the key policy priority among the 
British electorate, opinion is divided on whether the UK should leave the customs 
union. Second, the public is split on the potential trade-off between remaining in the 
European single market and the ability to control free movement of people across the 
borders. Third, Britons are opposed to sharing welfare benefits with others, but tend 
to support EU citizens living, working and doing business in the UK. However, they 
expect greater access to welfare for UK citizens in European countries compared to 
EU citizens in the UK.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
On 29 March 2017, the United Kingdom (UK) government triggered article 50 of the 
Lisbon Treaty, signalling the start of the two-year negotiations on the countryÕs 
departure from the European Union (EU). Since then, a key issue has occupied most 
Brexit observers: What does Brexit really mean? Or, in other words, what would be 
the nature of the UKÕs future relationship with the EU? Would a ÔsoftÕ or a ÔhardÕ 
version of Brexit be the most acceptable outcome to the British electorate? 
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The Brexit referendum result arose from a combination of factors, ranging from 
political disillusionment and the weak credibility of party elites to concerns related to 
the economy, immigration and welfare (e.g. Hobolt, 2016). This has led to different 
interpretations regarding the publicÕs view on the specificities of the UK-EU 
relationship post-Brexit (Menon and Fowler, 2016). Adding to this complexity, the 
British electorate was asked to indicate their general position on remaining or exiting 
the EU, rather than their preferences on specific areas of UK-EU cooperation. This 
has opened up long discussions regarding what type of Brexit British voters may 
prefer and what kind of Brexit the government should deliver. The fact that EU 
membership entails close cooperation in a number of different policy areas makes it 
even more difficult to assess which Brexit model is more likely to receive greater 
citizen support.   
 
While we cannot answer specifically what kind of Brexit the UK will deliver 
following its negotiations with the EU, as this depends on a variety of factors, our 
contribution presents a first attempt at understanding what people expect from the 
Brexit deal. We examine the British publicÕs key policy priorities during the Brexit 
negotiations, focusing specifically on two key aspects of the debate, i.e. (1) economy 
and trade and (2) immigration and citizenship. We do so through the use of data from 
a YouGov survey we ran on a sample of approximately 1700 individuals, fielded on 
29 June 2017, a few days following the start of the official Brexit negotiations. The 
sample was representative of the general British population in terms of age, gender, 
education, social grade, region, political attention, and EU referendum vote. 
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Our findings point to several contradictions in British public opinion. First, although 
economics and trade are distinctly the key policy priority among the British 
electorate, opinion is divided on whether the UK should leave the customs union and 
introduce customs checks on British imports and exports to the EU. Second, the 
public views trade and free movement of persons as a trade-off, albeit one that may 
turn out to be difficult for the UK government to address. Third, the key concern 
when it comes to EU freedom of movement relates to access to welfare, rather than 
the right of EU citizens to live, work and do business in the UK. However, the public 
expects greater access to welfare for UK citizens in European countries compared to 
EU citizens in the UK.  
 
Trade as a policy priority in Brexit talks   
 
To probe respondentsÕ views on the type of UK-EU relationship post-Brexit, we 
asked them to indicate which specific policy areas should be a priority for the UK 
government in the Brexit negotiations. Respondents were presented with a selection 
of nineteen policy areas related to existing frameworks of cooperation with the EU, 
and were invited to select up to five most important ones. Figure 1 displays the top 
policy priorities among the electorate. Areas of lower concern, e.g. sustainable 
development, digital security and development policy, are combined in the category 
ÔotherÕ. The survey findings demonstrate that trade is by far the highest policy priority 
for the UK public in the Brexit negotiations compared to other policy areas, such as 
health, foreign and security policy, employment, justice, agriculture, defence, and 
climate change. Altogether, 52 per cent of respondents selected trade as one of the top 
five priority areas for the UK government in the Brexit talks. The results seem to 
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suggest that the partisan and media focus on the post-Brexit trade agreement also 
coincides with public opinion.  
 
Figure 1: Key policy priorities in Brexit negotiations 
 
Source: AuthorsÕ survey, YouGov, 29 June 2017. 
 
But what exactly are the publicÕs expectations in this most important policy area? 
While there appears to be a consensus that trade should be the dominant issue in 
Brexit negotiations, citizens are much more divided in their support for the customs 
union. On average, 40 per cent of respondents agree and 36 per cent disagree that as 
part of the Brexit deal, the UK should leave the customs union and introduce customs 
checks on its imports from and exports to the EU (Figure 2). A noteworthy 24 per 
cent of respondents did not express a clear opinion on this question. In other words, 
although there is no strong public inclination towards either side, slightly more people 
prefer leaving rather than staying in the trade bloc. This implies that parts of the 
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population tend to believe that a free-trading UK can prosper after leaving the EU and 
that the UK will be able to strike its own global trade deals.  
 
Considering the polarisation on whether or not the UK should seek a clean break from 
the customs union, it comes as a certain surprise that an overwhelming majority of the 
citizens want free trade with the EU to continue, insisting that companies should still 
be able to trade goods and services freely after the UKÕs exit. Specifically, 78 per cent 
of the respondents support the freedom for European companies to trade freely in the 
UK as part of the Brexit deal, and 81 per cent wish for similar rights for British 
companies trading in the EU (Figure 2). The implies that while the majority of the 
British public want their country to maintain a strong trade relationship with the EU, a 
large part of the population support free trade with the EU but also want the UK to be 
able to negotiate its own trade deals with third countries. 
 
Figure 2: Public preferences on trade in Brexit negotiations  
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Source: AuthorsÕ survey, YouGov, 29 June 2017. 
 
Single market and EU migration: A potential trade-off?  
 
Given that the focus of the UKÕs Brexit negotiations is primarily economic, i.e. to 
strike a deal that would establish a strong economic partnership with the EU, how do 
British citizens view the balance between retaining the right to access the EUÕs single 
market on the one hand and placing restrictions on the free movement of people 
across their borders on the other? Our data indicate that the two are viewed as a trade-
off: the public remains divided, with more people wanting access to the European 
internal market over curbing EU migration into the UK. More specifically, 39 per cent 
of the respondents fall on the lower and 52 per cent on the higher half on an 11-point 
scale, where 0 indicates favouring the control of EU migration into the UK over 
access to the single market and 10 refers to preferring access to the single market over 
curbing EU migration (Figure 3). 8 per cent remain in the middle, demonstrating no 
clear disposition towards either side.  
 
Citizens, then, seem to be aware that it is unavoidable to accept certain levels of free 
movement of people in exchange for access to the largest economic bloc in the world. 
With both of these topics being highly political and highly contested, the majority of 
the respondents are apprehensive that a lot is at stake with regard to the countryÕs 
economy and tend to prioritise the post-Brexit trade agreement compared to 
controlling migration. For many others, however, the latter is too high a price to pay 
for full access to the single market.   
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Figure 3: Public preferences on access to the EUÕs single market vs controlling EU 
migration into the UK  
 
Source: AuthorsÕ survey, YouGov, 29 June 2017. 
 
The question of citizenship: EU and UK citizensÕ rights compared 
 
Focusing next on freedom of movement, our survey assessed the British publicÕs 
attitudes towards the rights of EU citizens in the UK and compared them to 
preferences regarding the rights of UK citizens in the EU. Starting with the former, 
we may witness that British public opinion is dispersed on EU-27 citizensÕ rights in 
the UK (Figure 4). There is much more support for EU citizens doing business in the 
UK as opposed to working and living in the UK. The least support is observed on the 
question of access to welfare where we find comparatively much more disagreement 
and potentially a level of polarisation among the electorate. On a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 denotes full disagreement and 10 full agreement, approximately a quarter of 
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the respondents (24 per cent) fully disagree that EU citizens should be allowed to 
claim welfare benefits in the UK. If we were to add those who have responded below 
5, i.e. the middle of point of the scale, then the proportion reaches 50 per cent of the 
respondents. This shows that opposition to EU citizens accessing welfare benefits in 
the UK is much higher than opposition to EU citizensÕ right to live, work and do 
business in the UK, which is at 21 per cent, 20 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. 
Put differently, the majority of British citizens tend to be in favour of EU citizens 
living, working and doing business in the UK, but are not as happy for them to claim 
welfare benefits in their country. 
 
Figure 4. Public attitudes towards the right of EU-27 citizens to live, work, do 
business and claim welfare benefits in the UK  
 
 
Source: AuthorsÕ survey, YouGov, 29 June 2017. 
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respondents are more supportive of their own rights abroad compared to EU-27 
citizensÕ rights in the UK. Overall, less people disagree that UK citizens should have 
the right to live, work, do business and claim welfare benefits in other EU countries 
(responses below point-5 on the scale). These percentages range from 14 per cent 
disagreeing that UK citizens should have the right to live in an EU country, 15 per 
cent opposing the UK citizensÕ right to work in the EU, only 7 per cent disagreeing 
that UK citizens should be able to do business in other EU countries, and 44 per cent 
arguing that UK citizens should not receive welfare abroad. The latter number on UK 
citizensÕ welfare rights in other EU countries is about 6 percentage points lower to 
those who oppose EU citizensÕ welfare access in the UK. This indicates that Britons 
tend to expect greater access to welfare for themselves in European countries than 
they are willing to accept for Europeans residing in the UK. That being said, however, 
British citizens remain polarised on the question of welfare access even if this 
concerns their own nationals abroad. 
 
Figure 5. Public attitudes towards the right of UK citizens to live, work, do business 
and claim welfare benefits in other EU countries 
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Source: AuthorsÕ survey, YouGov, 29 June 2017. 
 
Discussion  
 
In summary, our survey examining British public opinion on Brexit demonstrates that 
trade policy is the most important issue in negotiations with the EU. More than half of 
the respondents list trade among the top five policy priorities for the country in the 
context of the Brexit deal. Citizens remain polarised as to whether the UK should 
leave the customs union, but firmly support securing strong commercial and 
economic ties with the EU. The population is also divided on the potential trade-off 
between remaining in the European single market and the ability to control free 
movement of people across the borders, with more people nevertheless prioritising the 
former. The issue of EU freedom of movement appears controversial in itself: Britons 
are opposed to sharing welfare benefits with others, but tend to support EU citizens 
living, working and doing business in the UK. At the same time, the expectations 
regarding their own benefits in the EU exceed those that they are willing to accept for 
foreigners residing in the UK.     
 
The results point to an interesting contradiction where an independent UK trade 
policy on the one hand is expected by many to be compatible with preserving a close 
relationship with the countryÕs biggest trading partner on the other. This signals the 
widely-discussed Ôhave its cake and eat itÕ attitude in the UK where a desire to shape 
its own trade agenda is intertwined with a reluctance to let go of the advantages of 
tariff-free trade (see e.g. Goodwin, 2017). That being said, British citizens do not 
necessarily view the negotiations as a clear choice between a ÔsoftÕ 
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Brexit, as they tend to endorse key elements of both approaches (BBC, 2016). While 
they tend to support free trade with the EU, they are split on the general question of 
whether the UK should have access to the single market. Leaving the full customs 
union while still negotiating some form of access to the EUÕs internal market seems to 
be the most preferred option in the publicÕs view. Theresa May has promised a hard 
Brexit (see e.g. Borrelli, 2017), but needs to square this position with the reality of 
pressures towards maintaining strong commercial and economic ties with Europe. 
Considering the contradictions of the British publicÕs political expectations of the 
Brexit deal, the challenge for the UK government would be to address the votersÕ 
concerns in its Brexit negotiations. This is important both in terms of government 
accountability and policy responsiveness, and might present a real difficulty to the 
government especially given that the gap between the UKÕs expectations and the 
EUÕs negotiating line.   
 
Our findings also suggest that although the question of EU migration is very 
important to the public, and contributed to how people voted in the Brexit referendum 
in 2016 (Vasilopoulou, 2016), it is much more nuanced and potentially contradictory 
than we had previously thought. First, British nationals may be perceived as having 
Ôdouble standardsÕ, viewing non-nationals not having equal rights to themselves. This 
might undermine the UK governmentÕs popularity following a Brexit divorce deal 
that would guarantee equal rights for both UK nationals in EU member states and EU-
27 citizens in the UK. Second, the British public is much more agreeable to EU 
citizensÕ living, working and doing business in the UK, but are considerably less 
comfortable with sharing welfare. This suggests that the social aspect of EU 
citizenship, i.e. social integration and justice through access to the welfare state, is the 
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key issue featuring in the hearts and minds of the British public. This could be 
because the anti-EU campaigns, parties and individuals heavily politicised the welfare 
aspect of EU integration during the referendum, by for example associating EU 
membership costs with deficit in the NHS. It might also be because citizens perceive a 
fundamental incompatibility between the transnational nature of the EUÕs freedom of 
movement on the one hand and the national character of welfare states on the other. 
This might present another problem to the UK government given that the EU-27 
citizens that will remain in the UK post-Brexit will continue to have access to welfare. 
 
More broadly, the above conclusions are instructive with regard to the future of the 
academic study of public opinion in the EU. Political attitudes and citizen preferences 
are now more than ever before at the heart of EU politics with rising public 
Euroscepticism constraining the actions of both domestic governments and EU 
institutions. Thus far scholars have examined public support for, and opposition to, 
European integration (for an overview of key theories, see Hobolt and De Vries, 
2016). Going beyond the analysis of EuropeansÕ general view of EU membership and 
integration, more work needs to be done to understand how citizens view specific EU 
policies and the extent to which they apply Ôdouble standardsÕ when comparing 
themselves to other Europeans. In addition, we still do not know what may explain 
potential contradictions in peopleÕs attitudes towards different aspects of EU 
cooperation. Future work should thus address these theoretical and empirical gaps by 
developing novel frameworks and asking more precise questions in public opinion 
surveys.  
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